The transfer from an import-substitution to an export-orientation strategy has been in effect in Vietnam since the reform process, Doi Moi, necessitating the reformulation of macroeconomic, trading and sectoral policies. As a result, the industry sector has experienced gradual growth as the country's economy is becoming more open and gaining deeper integration with regional and the world economies, as exemplified by membership in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (1995) and World Trade Organization (2006). To support this integration process, the structure of the industrial sector has been changed to more appropriate since the Doi Moi.
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Introduction
One of the most important policy decisions that Vietnam made in the Doi Moi process was the shift from a strategy of import-substitution to one of export-orientation strategy. Obviously, Vietnamese policy-makers wanted to avoid the failure of the Latin American economies and to learn from the success of the industrialized nations and newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of East Asia, the renowned 'flying geese'. As a result, during the past decade, Vietnam industrial output grew at an average annual rate at 15.2 per cent and total annual exports increased 18.1 per cent (GSO 2011) .
Undeniably, the industrial and export performance has been the key driver of this economic growth, radically changing the country over the past two decades ago. Vietnam also experienced the widely increasing role of the dynamic foreign direct investment (FDI) and the private sector in manufacturing and exporting activities, in contrast to the earlier monopolistic behaviour and inefficiency of the centrally-planned state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Today, the remaining SOEs have become more active and competitive exporters, certainly a reflection of Vietnam's learning process and spill-over effects at both the country and cross-sector levels. Thus, it could be quite interesting and helpful if low-income countries were able to benefit from Vietnam's lessons and experience of achieving growth through industrial and export expansion.
However a number of questions can be raised with regard to Vietnam's industrial development: What is the role of industry in general, and manufacturing in particular, in the country's economic development? Are the industrialization policies consistent and clearly defined for the short term and long term? How does foreign investment contribute to industrialization in Vietnam? And more important, what is the role of the private sector in industrialization in the context of the government still firmly upholding the dominance of SOEs?
Industrial growth in Vietnam is based on its export-oriented policy. The country gained World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in 2007, and with a highly open economy, its total export value had reached 70.6 per cent of GDP by 2010. The momentum of the industry indicates that Vietnam has been on right track with regard to its industrial policy for the last 20 years. However, it is not certain that exporting firms have gained efficiency through exports. Thus, studying this subject should contribute to the industrial policy debate in Vietnam as the country's economy continues to struggle with the issue of how to raise the quality and competitiveness of exports and capacity of local exporters.
This scoping paper is structured in four section in addition to the introduction. Evolution of the industry describes the changes and historical episodes of the nation's industrial growth from 1965 to 1975 when Vietnam was united, adopting a central-planning economy. The Doi Moi process started in 1986 with open and market economy policies and the country joined the WTO in 2007. The second section analyses the structure of the industrial sector by sectoral composition, geographical distribution, ownership and industrial products, including the 'sunrise' and 'sunset' industries. The industrial policy framework is discussed in section three, outlining macroeconomic policy choices, trade policies and institutional and regulatory framework analysis. The fourth section analyses the industrial productivity patterns, with regard to output and turnover per worker by industrial sectors and ownership and firm sizes. Last but not least, the final section summarizes the most important outputs of the study that support emerging policies issues, and the ensuring solutions and adjustments. To prioritize the development of heavy industry; the industry sector was exclusively led by the SOEs Shift from heavy industry to fighting industry and agriculture To overcome consequences of the war and restore the country's infrastructure network and industrial bases, including the state entrepreneurship
To concentrate on heavy industry 1991-95: Development of prioritized sectors: heavy industry (cement, steel) and natural resource-based industries (oil exploitation and mining). Manufacturing sectors for the domestic demand (food stuff industries) and export of manufactured labour-intensive products at the same time
1996-2000:
Continuation of earlier priorities, but with greater selection Development of light export-oriented industries (textiles and garments, footwear, paper production)
2001-05:
Followed the objectives of the previous period, but expansion of manufacturing sector with a focus on development of high-tech sectors
Policies of boosting economic structural change towards industrialization and modernization; more export-oriented: continuation of earlier priorities, but with greater selection .
Instruments First 5-Yr Plan 1961-65
To continue the north's interrupted First 5-Yr Plan (1960-65) by incorporating the nationwide Second 5-Yr Plan (1976-80) Planning economy, no market-based price mechanism + Protectionism for some certain industries through tariff and non-tariff instruments such as quota and import/export duties and export subsidies + Encourage private businesses and foreign-owned enterprises with Law on Foreign Investment in 1987 and Company Law in 1991 + Implementation of Public. Investment Programme (1996 Programme ( -2000 + Equitization of SOEs and building of state economic groups to enhance the competitiveness of the SOE sector in the industry + Development of IZs, EPZs to encourage export production (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) + Specified many leading industries for development. Strategies approved for about 39 industries (see Appendix)
+ Promotion of technology transfer via foreign investment + Continued export production of manufactured products + Promulgation of Law on Investment and Law on enterprise to compliance with WTO commitments + Removal of non-tariff, but application of export tax rate at 0% continued for most export products to motivate the export activities High growth of heavy industry, but bureaucratic and unprofitable state-owned enterprises in industrial production; low labour productivity, material and technological shortfalls, and insufficient availability of food and consumer goods -'Picking-winner approach; Dualistic structure of Vietnam's industrial sector -Export structure was changed towards increasing the share of manufactured products; the main exporting products were still mining and crude oil -Inefficient SOE sector in industrial production; low industrial labour productivity
The import-substitution sectors failed to grow up and to provide sufficient supply for other downstream industries, including export-oriented ones
The export-oriented sector had to rely on inputs from import Desired spill-over impacts from FDI, particularly via technology transfer and linkages with domestic enterprises, were virtually non-existent
Industrial policies failed to facilitate firms' activities sufficiently
Remaining inefficient SOEs, including state economic groups
The industrial policy focused too much on specific sectors and products, not on improving competitiveness of enterprises Source: Vietnam's Five-year Socioeconomic Development Plans covering the 5-year periods from 1961 to 2015, as approved by the National Assembly.
4 1 The evolution of industry
The evolution of Vietnam's industrial process can be divided into four stages with main characteristics as illustrated in the policy matrix below.
Socialist industrialization in the centrally-planned economy, 1965-85
Although gaining independence in 1945, Vietnam was at war with the French until 1954, when the country was split into two warring parts, each with a different political and economic ideology. In such a context, socialist industrialization was adopted in the north to support the effort to re-unify the country after the American intervention in the south dating back to 1964.
At this time, Vietnam's economy was characterized by village-based subsistence agriculture. The occupying French government had developed agriculture production (rice and rubber) in the south and manufacturing (in fact, mainly coal-mining for export) in the north. After 80 years of colonialism and war, the country was severely damaged: infrastructure was minimal, the population poor and mainly illiterate, and entrepreneurship limited. Under the socialist model, economy was totally controlled by the state. Furthermore, in the context of land reform in the rural areas and the collective corporatization process, the private sector had no place in industrial production in the north.
All technical and scientific research activities were concentrated on servicing heavy industry and the war effort. Remarkably, most of the industrial development in this period was achieved through foreign assistance from Vietnam's socialist allies (China, the Soviet Union, and other East-bloc nations).
Vietnam's industrial policy of this time was articulated in the country's First Five-Year Plan (1961-65) which prioritized heavy industry. The plan, however, was disrupted in 1964, when the US started air strikes in the north, preventing progress in heavy industry and tilting what economic activity remained to light industry and agriculture.
The US bombings during 1965-72 destroyed all six industrial cities of the north as well as most of the provincial and district towns. All power stations, railway lines, roads, bridges, and sea and inland ports were seriously damaged, interrupting transportation routes and energy supplies, including power and petroleum. Consequently, the distribution of raw material and consumer goods was badly affected and delayed all large-scale construction. More importantly, since the vast majority of the labour force was employed in the war effort, the rest of the economy was constrained by severe labour shortages.
In the post-war period (1976-85), Vietnam faced three major economic challenges: (i) to repair the destructive consequences of the war and restore the country's infrastructure network and industrial bases, including state entrepreneurship; (ii) to adopt an unified and a centrally planned system for the whole country; and (iii) to continue the north's interrupted First Five-Year Plan (1960-65) to incorporate a Second Five-Year Plan (1976-80) as the nationwide strategy to achieve the ambitious target of building Vietnam into a socialist economy within 20 years.
During this period, industrial planning was the central function of the state's economic administration, with the government defining input and output levels for the entire economy. There was no market-based price mechanism, as open trade and private entrepreneurship were not officially recognized. Without a company law in existence, all industrial producers and traders were state-owned enterprises, governed directly by the ministries and provincial authorities, which made these highly bureaucratic and unprofitable.
More than 80 per cent of national income in the early 1980s came from the agricultural sector which was dominated by village-level 'collectives'. Growth of the agricultural and light industrial sectors outpaced that of heavy industry, despite its larger share of the government budget. Based on the scarce statistics that were (irregularly) published, industrial production increased at an annual rate of 9.5 per cent over 1981-85 and income per capita 6.4 per cent per annum. But the economy was characterized by small-scale production, low-labour productivity, high unemployment, material and technological shortfalls, and insufficient availability of food and consumer goods. During the years 1976-85, when the economy faced a slowdown, national income was said to have met 80-90 per cent of the needs, and the inflation throughout the period remained in double-digits. By 1985-86, Vietnam was on the brink of a socioeconomic crisis.
The transition from centrally-planned to market economy, 1986-2005
Against this backdrop, the government launched a comprehensive reform, 1 called Doi Moi (renovation) in December 1986. Doi Moi was engineered to transform the economy from a centralplanning subsidy economy towards a 'socialist-oriented market economy' that would combine state intervention (mostly at the planning phase) and free-market incentives and rules, where private businesses and foreign-owned enterprises were to be encouraged. 2 During the era steered by the Third Five-Year Plan (1986-90), annual production of steel increased 8 per cent, cement 11 per cent, electricity 11.1 per cent, and zinc 10 per cent. New industries emerged, especially with the discovery of oil (made possible through joint ventures between the state and foreign oil companies) which increased government revenues and accounted for the greatest share of Vietnamese exports. In the space of a few years , Vietnam transformed from a foodinsufficient country to become the world's second largest exporter of rice.
The Doi Moi process strongly influenced the development of Vietnam's industry. During 1991-95, average annual industry growth rate reached 13.7 per cent, a pace that was maintained in later years. Remarkable growth was evident in all industrial products, for example, coal exploration topped 26.39 million tons (or 5.7 times higher than in 1990); electricity (5.24 times over the 1990 level) cement (ten times), and assembled televisions (17.6 times).
As 2 This transition entailed several major changes in economic policy, including: (i) developing a multi-sectoral economy with official recognition of the private sector; (ii) removing subsidies and planning mechanisms, forcing state enterprises to become self-reliant; (iii) abolishing price controls for consumption goods. More importantly, industrial production was focused on three immediate needs, including food, consumer goods and export goods and (iv) since exportorientation was viewed as an important strategy for economic growth, foreign investment was encouraged.
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GDP increased from 14.36 per cent (1990) to 35.58 per cent (2004) . And the portion of the population below the poverty line dropped from 69 per cent (1990) to 28.9 per cent (2005). Dramatic changes were also observed in the structure of the economy. (2010) , the sectors using agro-products as input (food-processing, beverages) suffered the most. A similar trend in output growth was observed in capital-intensive sectors such as paper, chemicals, metal and metal products.
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The current structure of the industrial sector
Sectoral composition
It is obvious that the share of the manufacturing sector in industry has expanded. The processing and manufacturing sector accounted for 81.2 per cent in 2001, but had risen to 86.5 per cent a decade later. In contrast, the share of mining has decreased from 13.1 to 8.45 per cent (Figure 3 , see Appendix for a detailed breakdown).
Crude oil and gas made up the greatest share of the mining sector, which nevertheless declined gradually between 2000-10. Exports have been reduced since 2010 to supply crude oil to Vietnam's Dung Quat refinery, reducing oil export values from US$8.5 million in 2007 to US$5 million in 2010. Coal mining, on the other hand, has grown strongly, doubling its share from 1.2 per cent to 1.97 per cent of the total. 
Geographical distribution
Vietnamese industrial production is concentrated in the southeast and around the Red River Delta, particularly in the proximity of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. Statistics show that the strength of manufacturing is derived from FDI and the domestic non-state sector. Private businesses have focused on processing (garments, leather, food and beverages, wood and paper); chemicals and metallurgy (rubber, oil refinery, steel-making); and engineering and consumer goods (electronics, computers, automobiles, furniture, recycling). There may be two reasons for this. First, the private sector is yet to be allowed to invest in certain sectors such as crude oil exploration, energy and some other utility industries. And, second, most private firms are young with capital constraints and are thus unable to compete with the better-advantaged SOEs.
Within the FDI sector, manufacturing has been the largest and fastest-growing sector. It is well represented in mineral mining; yet due to diminishing oil production, this sector has seen negative growth since 2005 (Tables 4 and 5 ; see appendix for more details). 
Sunrise and sunset industries
'Sunrise' industries are emerging or fast-growing sectors that will generate growth, replacing the mature, declining 'sunset' industries. Although these will still continue to play an important role, their languishing profitability, stagnant productivity, and declining competitiveness will be taken over by new sectors. Table 6 lists the top 10 industries with the highest share in total industrial output. The sunset or sunrise industries of the recent 5-year period will be determined on the basis of the latest and fastest growth criteria. Several other indicators are also taken into account in grouping Vietnam's sunrise and sunset industries. These include: (i) the increasing number of enterprises in the field (ii) production outputs; (iii) annual export value; and (iv) industrial-policy orientation. To mention some impressive examples, the analysis shows that in 2005, there were only 82 metalmineral mining companies, but by 2009 this had jumped to 195 (an increase equivalent to 237.8 per cent). The number of enterprises in the coal and mining industry also increased from 56 up to 149 (266.1 per cent) during the same five years. But this positive development was mainly derived from increased demand rather than a breakthrough in technological innovation or enhanced position in the value chain. New entry of firms in textiles and garments, and wood and wood-related products has boosted the contribution of these sectors to total exports, bringing the two product groups into first and sixth place as Vietnam's top exporters, respectively. But these industries remain relatively uncompetitive, absorbing significant amounts of resources and labour. Once resources run out or the low-waged labour competitors in other developing countries emerge, Vietnam's competitiveness will be undermined.
Moreover, it needs to be mentioned that, thanks to deregulation and market liberalization process under WTO entry, the enterprises in the industrial sector and the economy as a whole have grown at annual rates of 17.2 per cent and 21.9 per cent and multiplied by 188.1% and 120.3% from 2005-09, respectively. Thus, a direct link does not always exist between the increasing number of new companies and successful growth, or between new entrants and structural change within industrial sectors. For example, in 2005 there were five oil and gas exploration companies, and just eight in 2006-09. Furthermore, the export value of crude oil declined over the same period, but this is not the whole story as exports has shifted from crude oil to domestically refined petroleum. Thus we need to examine other export and production indicators, and define the sectors with above-average growth rates during this period as sunrise industries. Accordingly, food and beverages was still the largest and fastest growing sector (14.88 per cent per annum). Furthermore, output doubled in five sectors: recycling products, automobiles, electronics, computers and optics, paper and products, rubber and plastics. However, despite the accelerating rise of recycling products and metal-mineral mining (23.9 per cent and 13.62 per cent, respectively), their share in the industry's total value added is rather limited because of their very low starting positions.
In comparison during the same period, the coal mining sector grew, on average, only 6.88 per cent per annum; oil and gas even decreased -2.99 per cent per annum. Also lagging behind the average of the entire sector were tobacco (1.58 per cent) and publishing and printing (9.96 per cent).
Finally, since export-based growth is a key strategic goal for Vietnam, the performance of firms in this sector should be examined. In 2007, with the exception of the electronics and computer components, all of the top ten exports (valued in excess of US$1 billion) were natural resourceintensive or labour-intensive products (i.e., low-level technology and added-values). By 2009, the garments industry (US$9.06 billion) had overtaken crude oil (US$6.19) in terms of value as the largest exporting sector. In conclusion, Vietnam's sunrise industries are concentrated in subsections such as food and metalmineral mining, oil refinery, beverages, textiles and garments, wood processing, rubber and plastics, metallurgy, electronics/computers and optics, furniture, and recycling products. But in a developing 14 country such as Vietnam where the every sector displays a strong upward trend from an original low base, it is hard to identify the true sunrise industries.
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The industrial policy framework
Macroeconomic policies
Prior to the 1980s, the Vietnamese economy was essentially characterized by a traditional centrallyplanned economy, in which the means of production were owned by the state; physical input, output, and prices were administered by the government; there was no business autonomy and the factor markets were absent. Goods and services were highly regulated. In terms of banking and financial sector, a governmental mono-banking system and a passive financial system with no effective policies to mobilize domestic savings 4 resulted in household reluctance to save. Investment was financed mostly through external sources. By the end of the 1980s, industrial production had stagnated. The unbalanced goods-monetary supply which entailed a boost of credit and M2 growth 5 (by 1987: 43.38 times, 1988: 206 .64 times) fuelled super inflation. By 1986, the consumption price index rose 774 per cent.
The reform or Doi Moi programme marked a turning point in policy, as it recognized the existence and essential role of a multi-ownership structure for Vietnam's economy. The re-engineering of policy included the removal of checks on internal trade, increased autonomy for the SOEs, and approval of the Law on Foreign Investment in 1987. In 1988, the functions of the central bank and commercials banks separated. In March 1989, Vietnam adopted a radical and comprehensive reform package aiming at stabilizing and opening the economy, and enhancing the freedom of choice for economic units and competition so as to fundamentally change the country's economic management system.
During the 1990s, the annual GDP growth rate averaged at 7.2 per cent and inflation was maintained at a single-digit level. This decade also experienced a new phase of industrialization, and there was a significant change in the sectoral structure of the economy.
In general, after comprehensive reform started in 1986, Vietnam's economic policies sought to promote high economic growth and, at the same time, to sustain macroeconomic stability. During the 2000s, economic growth had, nevertheless, relied heavily on expanding investment, but at the cost of investment efficiency. Table 8 also shows some weakness in the country's macro-policies, including the excessive credit growth, implying an escalation of money supply in the economy. Unfortunately, the added credit is said to have gone into real estate and to many of the less-than-efficient SOEs. The downfall of large SOEs 6 in association with the collapse in the real estate market generated serious problems for private companies and other manufacturing sectors, overturning the attempts at macro-stabilization in previous years.
Trade policies
Prior to the Doi Moi reform
Prior to the launch of Doi Moi, there had been almost no efforts to improve export and import policies and integration. The economy was effectively an autarchy after the war, and all available resources had been dedicated to recovering from the conflict. Foreign trade, in general, was the monopoly of the SOEs until 1989. The gradual change in trade policy in the post-Doi Moi period was evident in the elimination of quotas for most commodities in 1989. But these were still tightly controlled with licenses and quotas until normalized a decade later between 1998 and 2001.
The reform of Vietnam's trade policy, which was the cornerstone of the 1986 Doi Moi strategy, had two main objectives. The first objective was to make the transition from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy by: (i) liberalizing and linking domestic prices to world prices so that they would have a role in guiding resources; (ii) increasing the number of trading entities beyond the initial number of centrally-controlled foreign trade companies to avoid distortions in price signals through anti-competitive behaviour by monopoly SOEs or through the de facto quantitative restrictions; (iii) developing trade policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas and licenses; and (iv) and removing exchange rate distortions. This re-design of the trading system was inextricably linked with reform of the enterprise sector to allow indirect regulation through market prices to replace the direct regulation of enterprise outputs. The second objective was to promote export-oriented industries by redressing the anti-export bias embedded in the protectionist regime.
The years 2001-05
Significant changes in export and import regulations were introduced in the 2001-05 period, such as the gradual expansion of export and import privileges. With a few exceptions, this enabled enterprises to export all types of goods. Furthermore, the list of banned export and import goods was extended to cover a five-year period (2001-05), thus replacing the earlier practice of lists being issued on an annual basis. In addition to the roadmap for removing import licenses, quotas on rice exports and fertilizer imports were abolished, and the regulation of the main enterprises trading in these items lifted. This created a clearer, regulatory framework for export and import.
Two main export-supporting policies were also issued by the government during the years 2001-05. According to the first measure, 7 enterprises could benefit from two forms of medium-and longterm credit (investment loans, post-investment interest subsidies, and export credit guarantee) and short-term credit (short-term loans, bidding guarantee and contract guarantee). And, second, to encourage the export of agricultural products, a 'reward' or bonus (based on export value) was introduced in 1998 to major exporters of rice, coffee, pork, vegetables and fruits, cashew nuts, pepper, tea, peanut, handicraft, and plastic products. In compliance with WTO principles, the Vietnam Development Bank was re-organized from its previous incarnation 8 for making credit available for development and export. In addition, the government was committed to eliminating direct export support (including the exporting reward), and supported the implementation of trade promotion programme for advertising, promoting products in key markets, expansion and entry into new markets and diversification of the export market. 9 WTO membership created new opportunities for Vietnamese firms to enter global markets at lower tariffs. This has put Vietnamese exports on an equal footing with those from other WTO members and has helped to increase its exports ( Figure 5 ).
Yet, Vietnam's exports have been negatively affected by high domestic inflation and the global financial crisis since the mid-2008. The global recession led to a decline in world demand which, in turn, caused a fall in Vietnam's exports (-9.0 per cent). But exports recovered in 2010 more rapidly than projected. Totalling US$72.027 billion, exports had increased by 26.3 per cent, surpassing the average 18.1 per cent rate for the years 2001-0, and exceeding the projected 15 per cent target set by the development strategy for the export and import of goods and services for this period.
In addition to agreements within WTO framework, export performance of the textiles/garments and aquaculture subsectors has been affected by other FTAs implemented by Vietnam. 10 In general, changes in trade policies during the last two decades were facilitated by an integration process. As a result, industrial policy has been redirected towards promoting the country's export industries. 
The institutional and regulatory framework
Vietnam's industrial policy framework is governed by a national Socioeconomic Development Strategy (SEDS) projected for a ten-year period. 11 This is complemented with a five-year socioeconomic development plan (plan) as well as sectoral and industrial strategies and master plans. The Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for conducting and supervising industrial strategies and plans, while the Ministry of Planning and Investment undertakes the implementation of five-year plans articulated within the SEDS and investment policy, including coordination with the private sector through its Foreign Investment Agency (FIA), Enterprise Development Agency and Department of Economic Zones.
During 1991-95, the main objective of the industrial policy was to facilitate structural change, particularly for key sectors and regions. The two main key sectors being singled out in the five-year plan were heavy industry and natural resource exploitation, particularly crude oil, electricity, manufacturing, construction material, oil refinery, fertilizer production. In addition, other goals included the development of the agricultural, forestry and fishery sectors in close coordination with the manufacturing sector; consumption goods production and labour-intensive and export-oriented industries. The 1991-95 plan also prioritized the construction of infrastructure and transportation networks, and the modernization of the post and telecom networks both domestically and internationally.
It is obvious that the 1991-95 plan embodied two conflicting policies; on one hand, priority was given to the development of heavy industries and some manufacturing sectors that mainly serve domestic demand, which was considered to justify protectionism for certain industries. But on the other hand, exports, particularly by the manufacturing sector, were encouraged. In this period, although the aim was to improve the export structure towards increasing the share of manufacturing sector, mining and exploitation industries, including crude oil, still constituted the main exports.
Investment, for achieving the industrial policy goals, was mobilized by the government through the SOEs, and after the revision of the foreign investment law in 1992, the government undertook some measures to attract and mobilize external resources.
The five-year plan for 1996-2000 outlined the projected economic development figures. The annual growth rate for agriculture-forestry and fishery sector was, on average, 4.5-5 per cent, 14-15 per cent for industry, 12-13 per cent for services. The structural shift that followed was mainly aimed at quickly increasing the share of industry in the economy.
The main objectives in this period were still focused on heavy industry with its goal of meeting domestic demand and exploiting natural resources, but with an added emphasis on some sectors such as steel and cements. Disbursement among sectors was not as widely spread as the previous plan. In addition, the development of light, mainly export-oriented, industries 12 was targeted because of Vietnam's comparative advantage with regard to lower labour costs. Manufacturing industries were pushed to develop the food processing industry and consumption production, with a 19 priority given to sugarcane. Agricultural sector policies were initially linked with processing industries in agriculture, forestry and fishery to reform industrialization within the rural economy. The upgrading and construction of new key infrastructure were pushed, particularly the development of telecommunications, tourism, and consultation services on technology, finance, audit, banking and insurance.
A new reform of this period was the introduction of the Public Investment Programme (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) to implement certain industrial development goals. In addition to state investment, the government sought to attract private investment through regulatory revisions to the Law on Enterprises in 1999, and Law on Encouragement of Domestic Investment in 1998. In 2000, foreign investment policies were amended to create more favourable conditions for investors, as reflected in the Revised Foreign Investment Law.
In addition, the development of the EPZs and IZs proposed in 1996 was regarded as an important tool for achieving the goals of industrial policies, as these would conveniently provide the necessary infrastructure for new industries. In other words, the 1996-2000 plan basically relied on the previous plan but had greater focus. The most prominent feature in the 1996-2000 plan was the change in its approach: industrial clustering and sectors which could generate more jobs were encouraged. The government also placed greater reliance on market instruments such as tax and credit policies to attain targets rather applying the administrative instruments of the earlier eras.
The Socioeconomic Development Strategy (SEDS) for the years 2001-10 sought to achieve the country's 10-year development targets through the acceleration of growth and development, improvements in quality both quantitatively and qualitatively, and a strong emphasis on the efficiency and sustainability of growth and development. These objectives guided Vietnam's strategy, as implemented according to the two five-year plan: 2001-05 and 2006-10.
The 2001-05 plan continued the earlier policies geared to boosting economic structural change towards industrialization and modernization, by promoting the development of industry, encouraging the service sector and creating a linkage between agricultural advancement with rural economic development. Although protection was maintained for some industries, 13 it was more selective in terms of capital and technology. In addition, small and medium enterprises were supported through the SME promotion policy. Industrial policies in the 2001-05 plan had been revised from the two previous plans. Now there was a significant change in approach, with greater focus on small-and medium-enterprise development. But the sectors were widely diverse and thus failed to attract industries that could leverage the development of others. By 2001, 'The orientation of industrial development' document issued by the 20 9th Vietnam Communist Party Congress identified 11 leading industries. 14 This was too many, and led to the dispersion of investment resources and low efficiency.
The goals outlined in the recent plan for the period 2006-10 included: (i) enhancing economic growth, increasing efficiency, sustainability and competitiveness of the economy; (ii) active integration and creating a breakthrough in international economic integration; and (iii) creating a favourable environment for entrepreneurial development. The target for economic structure during this period was 15-16 per cent for the agriculture-forestry-fishery sector, 43-44 per cent for industry and 40-41 per cent for the service sector. The agriculture-forestry-fishery sector is increasingly characterized by better quality, higher productivity and more competition. More attention was given to growing high value crops such as industrial crops or high-quality rice. In particular, the government has encouraged post-harvest preserving, the linkages between crops and foodprocessing as well as sustainable agriculture production. Because of the drive to preserve natural resources and protect the environment, the mining industries are gradually losing importance while the manufacturing industries continue to grow despite stronger competition in the wake of Vietnam's accession to WTO. Industrial plans have been revised to upgrade and improve the existing EPZs and IZs towards greater involvement of both domestic economic actors as well as foreign investors.
The XI National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party (January 2011) approved the Socioeconomic Development Strategy for 2011-20 period. In addition to maintaining the vision of an industrialized Vietnam by 2020, the plan emphasizes knowledge-intensive industrial production and higher local content in products. Although heavy industries (mining, high-tech, defence, energy) and manufacturing industries are encouraged, support is limited to those competitively advantaged to be able to join higher positions in the global value chain. The document highlighted humanresources training as one of the three bottlenecks that need to be urgently addressed.
Most recently, the 3rd Session of the Party's Central Committee in October 2011 re-affirmed the need to restructure the economy. Over the coming five years, restructuring efforts will concentrate in three major areas--investment, financial market and the SOEs. In fact, governmental agencies in recent months have reviewed and redesigned relevant policies. As the anticipated spill-over effects from FDI rarely materialize and the decentralization of the licensing policy has opened the door for increasingly disadvantageous competition among provinces, the government is re-thinking its strategy: which sectors should be singled out for foreign investment and how to withdraw the excessively favourable incentives currently being offered to foreign investors. Similarly, the State Bank stipulated that by this year-end commercial banks are to cut financial sector credits by 16 per cent (especially real estates and stocks) to free capital for use by the manufacturing and services sectors.
Sectoral specific policies
In the 1960s, priority was given to heavy industry (VCPC 1960: 79) based on the argument that the vital goal of Vietnam at that time was to develop its defence industry in the face of the anti-American war. However, 16 years later when reunification of the nation was complete, Vietnam continued to give precedence to heavy industry. But following the Doi Moi process, Vietnam launched three major economic programmes aimed at creating the necessary foundation for a modern industrial sector: food production, consumer goods and export goods. Investments in heavy industry and infrastructure were oriented to serve these three major economic programmes, with highest priority given to the electricity, coal, oil and gas industries.
In 1996, along with trade liberalization, Vietnam defined its key industries to include food processing, manufacturing consumer goods, export goods, electronics and information technology. In addition, the government continued sector policies to selectively develop certain heavy industry: energy and fuel; building materials; mechanical engineering; shipbuilding; metallurgy, and chemicals. In 2001 in the so-called 'Orientation of Industrial Development' document, Vietnam singled out 11 sectors as leading industries, considered to be vital for boosting the country's industrialization process. 15 Over the years 2001 to 2005, the government also approved a number of strategies on sector development based on the prioritized industries (see Appendix).
During this period a number of incentive policies and measures were formulated to implement the sector development strategies. These can be divided into five groups: (i) market-oriented policies, (ii) policy to mobilize resources, (iii) tax policy; (iv) R&D policy; and (v) human resource development policy.
In general, sector-specific policies relied heavily on protectionism through financial incentives. But the over-enthusiastic identification of the key industries led to dispersed state investments in the context of low levels of accumulated public saving. As a result, after 20 years of Doi Moi, the favoured subsectors (automotive, machinery, information technology, sugar, etc.) have failed to achieve the anticipated outcomes, mainly because these favourites had not fitted the role of leading industries, and because some policy incentives had not succeeded as expected (Do Hoang Toan and Vu Trong Lam 2007).
The Prime Minister's decision (no. 55/2007/ QĐ-TTg ) approving the list of priority industries and leading industries for 2006-10 was renewed with a number of incentive policies and measures. Accordingly, three key industries were defined for period 2007 to 2020. These included: (i) mechanical engineering (automobile, shipbuilding, complete equipment, agricultural machinery, mechatronics); (ii) electronic equipment, telecommunications and information technology; and (iii) products from new technologies (new energy, renewable energy, software, digital content).
In addition, seven sub industries were identified (including textiles, leather and footwear, plastic, agriculture-forestry-fishery processing, bauxite mining and processing, steel, and chemicals). Eventually, the plastic industry was dropped from the priority-industry list for 2011-15; and bauxite mining and processing and steel dropped from the 2016-20 list. The fact that the plastics industry has expanded quickly (with an average annual growth rate of 20-25 per cent during 2005-10) thus gaining an internationally competitive position without support, may account for its fall from the priority-industry list. The plastics industry accounted for 4.48 per cent of the total industrial output value of the whole country. Vietnamese plastic products are not only widely consumed on domestic markets but are also exported to 55 countries and territories. Many plastics firms in Vietnam have gained recognition with prestigious trade marks (Hong Luc and Ma Phuong 2011). Sustainable development seems to have been the reason for removing bauxite mining and processing from the 2016-20 list of priority industries. Furthermore, it is assumed the steel industry's elimination from the 2016-20 priority-country list is based on the rational that its steel products lack the competitive advantage of countries with a long tradition of manufacturing these products (Vu Ngoc Lan et al. 2008 ).
Remarkably, the government provided a number of incentive policies targeted at two groups: (i) priority industries and (ii) leading industries. Government support to priority industries focused on three main areas: the provision of a production site, trade promotion support and R&D activities. Production sites were allocated promptly to support new investment, expansion investment or intensive investment projects (including projects associated with relocating production). In terms of trade promotion, financial support was available for building and developing enterprise brand names and improving international quality-management standards (through industry associations). Moreover, enterprises in prioritized industries have been free to introduce products on the website of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, as well as display and introduce their products freely at trade fairs and exhibitions of national and local levels
Financial support to enterprises in the prioritized sectors was also forthcoming for R&D-related activities. Central budget allocations have been directed towards: (i) efforts in technology transfers (including trial production under the technology transferred); (ii) strengthening the capability of scientific and technological bodies (laboratories, laboratory standards, R&D institutions, etc.); and (iii) researching and adapting modern technology or equipment to improve productivity, quality and lower production costs. At the same time, funding from local-level budgets has been allocated for test-trial production (new products, materials and auxiliary materials to replace imports) before technology or equipment is utilized in mass production. Incentive policies for the priority industries have extended to all leading/key industries. In addition financial support has been provided to manufacturing projects aiming at environmental protection.
Generally speaking, Vietnam seems to have over-emphasized its efforts with the leading and prioritized industries. Most of these 5-10 page strategies were developed around 2002 and were included in projections extending to 2020-25 (see Appendix). The importance of the industrial sector is mirrored in these documents; these stipulate the products that comprise the sector, its quantitative production objectives and expected share of total export value by 2010-20. For example, the engineering industry was to account for 40-50 per cent of the total engineering demand by 2010: of this, 30 per cent was to be exported. The automotive industry was to serve 80 of the domestic demand for standard cars, and have 60 per cent level of local content.
Nonetheless, sector-specific polices are inadequate for achieving the hoped-for goals, and offer little more than a list of the general instruments such as tax reductions, protective barriers, or encouraging calls for investment. Another weakness is that not all of the necessary components of a strategy are included, such as research-supported reasoning, comparative advantage-disadvantage assessments, resource-and demand-supply projections, and risk management. But most important, an overall strategy covering the nation's entire industry does not exist. Each industrial strategy is prepared by the relevant governmental agency specialized in that field, in consultation with the related business association. This induces a situation where each member believes his particular industry should be prioritized, with the ultimate result that too many sectors are targeted, impeding policy coherence. The strategy for steel production is misaligned due to an inaccurate evaluation of the domestic market. At present, production capacity stands at roughly 9.0 million tons of (excluding 1.5 million tons from coming five big projects) of which 6.0 million tons goes to meet domestic demand. Moreover, steel imported from China and ASEAN is increasingly cheaper due to the Vietnam's economic integration commitments.
The Vietnamese mechanical engineering industry has been largely dependent on imported raw materials; major materials such as alloy steel, stainless steel and non-ferrous metals for machinery manufacture are all imported. For example, the shipbuilding industry needs to import vast amounts of solder but industries to supply intermediate products have not been developed. A central problem is the lack of transparency and poor management. VINASHIN, once considered the stalwart of the shipping industry, signed a number of underpriced contracts, 16 making it hugely unprofitable, and costing the state considerable amounts of cheap capital that had been invested in the firm (including government bonds, valued at US$750 million). FDI companies are dominant in the motorbike markets, with yearly production increasing by 20 per cent. The strategy for the development of Vietnam's automotive industry up to year the 2010, with the projection up to 2020 is now considered a failure: no objectives have been achieved.
The electronics sector has been protected for more than 10 years, but like many other mechanical subsectors (automobile and shipbuilding), it still imports most components for domestic assembly.
Similarly, Vietnam's electricity supply has an impact on production throughout the country. The dry season can affect the capacity of the hydropower plants, particularly in provinces where many steelproduction FDI projects have been approved. The pace of equitization (or privatization) in power suppliers and retailers has been very slow. The electricity group of Vietnam (EVN) still controls most of the power markets. Its investment portfolio in diversified areas such as finance and real estates has been unprofitable, leading to insufficient capital for new power projects. Vietnam is currently an importer of electricity. Electricity prices tend to rise quickly over time, but according to EVN, they are still low. This makes private sector investments in the power sector unattractive.
24
Moreover, while the government's strategy for energy considers nuclear power a promising solution, this type of power source is increasingly controversial. The country has made no significant progress in developing and using alternative or renewable energy sources (other than hydroelectricity). In contrast, during the same period, computers, electronics and optical products is the only manufacturing sector with a negative output growth rate per worker, averaging -2 per cent per annum. Although output value has risen, its growth rate lags behind the growth rate of workers.
Within a single year (2009), output per worker dropped 20 per cent (from US$22,171 per worker to US$17,710) because large computer and electronics markets were negatively affected by the global crisis, reducing demand. In addition, the fact that the number of workers has grown faster than industrial output strengthens the view that electronics firms in Vietnam are engaged mostly in the labour-intensive and low value-added stages of production. The manufacture of computers, electronics and optical products, according to the OECD, is classified as a high-tech industry but based on the Vietnam's recent productivity, the country is currently unable to rely on high-tech industries for industrial productivity growth. 
Net turnover per worker
Net turnover per worker in the manufacturing sector increased from US$10,592 per worker in 2001 to US$25,693 per worker in 2009 (see Table 11 ). This trend has been stable throughout the period, recording an eight-fold increase in net turnover and a three-fold increase in the number of workers. Given the volatility of world economy during this period, the steady positive development is an encouraging sign. In addition, net turnover per worker of manufactured food and beverage in 2009 was nearly nine times that of the agricultural sector, reflecting the importance of the manufacturing sector for improving productivity. The electricity, gas, steam, water supply sector ranks first in terms of net turnover per worker during 2000-09 (rising from US$18,890 in 2001 to US$67,508 in 2009). The mining and quarrying sector had the second highest net turnover per worker in 2009 (reaching US$52,674/per worker). Of the four industrial sectors, mining and quarrying was the only one experiencing a decline in net turnover in 2009, due largely to weaker demand in the Chinese market.
Nevertheless, neither sector can compare to the manufacturing sector in terms of net turnover and the number of workers. In 2009, the manufacturing sector employed over 4.1 million people, nearly eight times the combined figure of the mining/quarrying and electricity/gas/steam sectors. The manufacturing sector also generated nearly US$106 billion in 2009, which was six times the combined figure of the two aforementioned sectors. Most of the firms in this sector are limited to assembly operations and are dependent on imported parts. Vietnam cannot compete in computers with China or other ASEAN countries in terms of price because of tariffs on imported components and the country's failure to increase local content. Given the current undeveloped supporting industries, if tariffs on computer parts/accessories are not reduced soon, it is possible that foreign-invested enterprises will re-locate operations to countries with lower costs. Domestic firms will struggle to maintain operations. Net turnover per worker in non-state enterprises in the mining and quarrying sector increased nearly 2.5 times during 2004-08 (US$3,937 to US$9,454). However, in terms of value, productivity of the non-state enterprises does not compare to that of FIEs. Indeed, net turnover per worker of nonstate enterprises in 2008 was US$9,454 compared to US$812,327 for the FIEs. Most of these FIEs are from China, established either as joint ventures with their Vietnamese counterparts or direct investments into the mining and quarrying sector. 17 Most metallic and non-metallic minerals be exported to China where demand has been increasing dramatically. 
Net turnover per worker by industrial sector and firm size
In terms of firm size, small-and medium-sized firms in the manufacturing sector have higher net turnover per worker than large firms. In 2008, the highest average net turnover per worker (US$33,877) was recorded for medium-sized firms (with 200 to 299 employees). But the largest increase in net turnover per worker (from US$13,273 to US$32,180) during 2004-08 was evident within micro firms with 5 to 9 employees. This shows the important role of small-and mediumfirms in the manufacturing sector and also implies that large manufactured firms have not been able to utilize economies of scale.
Mining and quarrying and electricity, gas, water supply are the two industrial sectors where large firms exhibit the highest net turnover per worker, attaining respectively US$183,000 and US$213,000 in 2008. Moreover, firms employing between 1,000-4,999 workers in the electricity/gas/water sector achieved the largest increase in net turnover per worker during 2004-08. The rapid growth of net turnover in this sector came mostly from the many hydroelectrically plants that were built during the period. Hydroelectricity investments since 2007 have become popular, reflecting the sector's high rates of return. For example, there are nearly 150 hydroelectricity projects currently being implemented or soon to be carried out in the central provinces of Quang Nam and Hue and the highland provinces of Kontum and Dak Nong. 18 Source: GSO.
Emerging policy issues
The top three issues in the current industrial policy debate
Vietnam has successfully implemented the programmes outlined in its Socioeconomic Development Strategy Plans for the period 2001-10. Yet, the economy is faced with insufficient quality improvement, slow shift in economic structure and little potential for current modality of growth. The industry sector has been the key driver of growth in Vietnam in the last decades, accounting for a larger share in GDP and employment, and the shift towards products with higher value added and technological content. Overall, Vietnam's industrialization strategy and industrial policy, however, seemed to place greater emphasis on achieving a high rate of economic growth and economic structural change rather than building up industrial competitiveness and new competitive industries for future growth, as illustrated in this paper.
Currently, Vietnam is launching a new Socioeconomic Development Strategy to cover the 2011-20 period. The plan strives to achieve three goals, including improvement of market-oriented institutions, infrastructure and human resources for industrialization and modernization. Since the overall goal of 2011-20 SEDS is to transform Vietnam into an industrialized country by 2020, the debate of the current industrial policy is now focused on three major issues.
First, industrial policy in the past has made little contribution to improving Vietnam's competitiveness, given that the share of the industry sector in GDP increased over time. However, the dual-nature of Vietnam's industrial sector is a weakness rather than a strength. The import-29 substitution sectors have failed to grow and provide sufficient input for downstream industries, including export-oriented ones (e.g., textiles or chemical industries). Similarly, the export-oriented sector has had to rely heavily on imports, rather than input from domestic industries because of the absence of local suppliers and supporting industries. Furthermore, desired spillovers from FDI, particularly via technology transfer and linkages with domestic enterprises, have been rare.
Second, earlier industrial policies failed to facilitate change in firm structure and building of largesized private enterprises. Furthermore, facts on supporting policies (especially for exports) remained scattered among many different documents and were inconsistent, particularly the range and type of financial incentives and instruments used. Industrial policy also failed to stimulate enterprises to actively build partnerships as well as production linkages to reduce costs and improve productivity. Sectoral policy overemphasized specific sectors and products at the expense of improving the competitiveness of enterprises. And lastly, Vietnam's firm structure has remained relatively unchanged: while the number of newly established private firms increased steadily after the Enterprise Law 2000 took into effect, most are small or medium-sized enterprises.
Lastly, Vietnam still lacks a well-coordinated framework for industrial policy (sector specific policy, trade policy, macroeconomic policy and other policies). Individual sector strategies and plans are developed in isolation, without coordination. With regard to investment policy, there is no discrimination among sectors, with the exception of sectors with investment priorities. Moreover, while production projects and export-oriented sectors have access to preferential credit policy, the majority of beneficiaries are SOEs, rather than private enterprises.
How are these issues to be addressed?
Industrial development, as outlined in the 2011-20 SEDS, can only be achieved by restructuring industrial production (such as increasing technology, local content, linkages in regional and global production network; development of supporting industries and industrial clusters). But the SEDS has failed to provide adequate guidelines on sectoral strategies. Each development strategy and/or master plan sets out ambiguous targets/objectives and broad implementation measures without sufficient detail and feasibility assessments. Moreover, there is no industrial strategy extending beyond 2020.
Vietnam is regarded as a relatively open economy following its WTO accession. Industrial policy should, therefore, aim to facilitate the productivity gain (for example, learning by exporting) from export activities rather than simply endorse export expansion for ensuring long-term growth of the economy. The policy is also expected to improve firm structure and build linkages between domestic and foreign-invested firms. This is an important point for Vietnam because the main beneficiary of past industrial policies has been the SOE sector which has enjoyed protectionist measures but remained relatively inefficient and uncompetitive.
What is the preferred sequencing of the research programme to make the results relevant to policy?
Vietnam's SEDS for the period 2011-20 strongly underscores an export-oriented strategy for improving the competitiveness at both aggregate-and firm-level. While the manufacturing sector has expanded at a high growth rate and made a considerable contribution to Vietnam's export and growth performance, the question of whether or not manufacturing firms could learn from exporting to increase productivity and competitiveness remains open. − General policies on investment, technological improvement, pricing, human resources.
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